2024 Georgian parliamentary election
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Georgia portal |
Parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in Georgia on 26 October 2024.[1][2][3] The elections are held under the rules passed in 2017 through the constitutional amendments which shifted the electoral system towards a fully proportional representation with a 5% electoral threshold.[4]
Although the Georgian Dream (GD), a ruling party since 2012, remains the most popular party, it has lost ground since the 2020 elections, while the opposition up until recently had been deeply divided and struggled to unite against GD, complicating their efforts to deprive the party of a parliamentary majority.[5][6] The largest opposition party United National Movement (UNM) has suffered an internal division and split over the role of a shadowy businessman Davit Kezerashvili, who has recently been involved in a scandal over allegedly running fraudulent call centers in Europe.[7][8] Even though an idea of a unified opposition front failed, several opposition parties, including UNM, managed to create several informal coalitions to run joint electoral lists in the elections: Unity – National Movement, Strong Georgia, and Coalition for Change. Some parties did not join any coalitions and decided to run independently, such as For Georgia, Girchi and Georgian Labor Party.[9] Majority of opposition parties signed the Georgian Charter, agreeing, among other things, on not cooperating with the Georgian Dream to form a coalition government.[10]
The founder of the Georgian Dream, an influential oligarch and former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, often regarded as the country's éminence grise following his official departure from politics in 2021, has returned to politics several months prior to the polls to lead the party in the elections.[11] While Georgians broadly favor EU and NATO membership, they remain wary of potential conflicts with Russia, with the GD positioning itself as the only party capable of safeguarding peace through a "pragmatic policy" with Russia amid the war in Ukraine, accusing the "Global War Party", which the party considers to have substantial influence on the Western governments, of trying to drag the country into the conflict.[12] Additionally, the party has been promoting socially conservative policies, particularly the recent "LGBT propaganda law".[13][14][15][16] Georgian Dream has also vowed to outlaw the vast majority of opposition political parties, accusing them of collaborating with UNM, which GD considers to have committed crimes during its rule, such as "dragging country in the 2008 war with Russia" and instituting "the system of violence and torture".[17][18][19][20] Simultaneously, Ivanishvili also made overtures to the Kremlin, calling for an apology for Georgia's role in the 2008 war.[21] Georgian Dream has also strengthened ties with China,[22][23] whilst promising to join the European Union whilst "playing by Georgian rules".[24]
The opponents of Georgian Dream have focused on criticizing what they describe as "pro-Russian shift" of the party.[25] Denouncing the Georgian Dream's rhetoric on the European integration as doublethink,[26] the opposition parties vowed to strengthen relations with the European Union, including furthering Georgia's accession into EU and also NATO, signing a memorandum "to defend and protect Georgia's path towards European integration".[13][27] In particular, the opposition vowed to fulfill all EU's recommendations and open the membership negotiations with the European Union.[28] The opposition parties have denounced the Georgian Dream's policy as "threatening to push Georgia into the international isolation and into the backyard of occupier power, Russia", as well as alienating "Georgia's Western allies and Ukraine, a defender of the freedom of whole civilized world".[29] Besides the pro-EU opposition, the Georgian Dream is also challenged by a coalition of Alliance of Patriots and Alt-Info parties, which have for years consistently campaigned on electoral issues which the GD has only recently adopted, such as conservatism and strong anti-Western rhetoric.[9] All sides have presented the upcoming election as a "decisive referendum".[13]
The election was preceded by the 2023–2024 Georgian protests over controversial legislation requiring organizations receiving foreign funding to register as "foreign agents," which has sparked accusations of authoritarianism.[30][31] This law has strained relations with the West, leading to U.S. sanctions against several Georgian officials for human rights abuses and discussions about potential aid reductions to Tbilisi.[32] The EU, which granted Georgia membership candidate status in December, has now frozen its application and warned that visa-free travel could be suspended if the upcoming elections are not free and fair.[33][34] US Congress proposed initiatives like the MEGOBARI Act and the Georgian People's Act aimed to "combat democratic backsliding" and impose sanctions on those "undermining democracy while offering incentives to strengthen Georgia's democratic institutions".[35][36] Some analysts, on the other hand, have opined that the US and EU are interfering into Georgia's internal affairs and "undermining its sovereignity" in order to protect their large "influence network" of Western-funded NGOs in Georgia.[37][38][39]
Background
[edit]Political context
[edit]By the time of the elections, Georgian Dream had been the ruling party in Georgia since defeating Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) in the 2012 parliamentary election. Announcing its plans to pursue a policy of joining the European Union and NATO, Georgian Dream has also professed a more conciliatory approach towards Russia compared to its anti-Russian opponents.[40]
However, the geopolitical strains of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict made it more difficult to maintain a balancing act, amid statements from Ukrainian politicians that Georgia would have "greatly aided" Ukraine by opening a "second front" against Russia[41] and Western efforts to isolate Russia with international sanctions.[citation needed]
During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Georgian government condemned Russian actions and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, but did not join the sanctions against Russia, which allowed an influx of Russian capital and highly skilled Russians dodging military mobilization. Russia, in turn, did not approve the proposal of Georgia's breakaway de facto South Ossetian republic to hold a referendum on joining the Russian Federation[42] and, despite otherwise hostile relations, has not put Georgia on its unfriendly countries list.[43]
On 25 February 2022, large protests took place in front of the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi, lasting for six consecutive days to show solidarity with Ukraine. The demonstration took on an anti-government tone, reflecting growing frustration with the Georgian authorities' allegedly inadequate response to Russian invasion.[44][45][46]
Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa party, addressed the crowd, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and his administration. She called for immediate and effective actions to support Ukraine, such as closing sky for Russia, and urged Georgia to apply for EU membership.[47]
The rally also underscored dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the crisis. Protesters were angered by obstacles created for volunteers and the government's refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia.[48] On February 28, Georgian authorities did not give a landing permission to a Ukrainian charter sent to transport Georgian volunteers from Georgia to Ukraine.[49] The Georgian Dream leader Mamuka Mdinaradze said that Georgia could not allow to send volunteers to Ukraine because Georgia was in vulnerable position and it would risk a war with Russia.[50] In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's decided to recall Ukraine's ambassador to Georgia.[51] Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili had also announced that Georgia would not join Western sanctions against Russia because it would harm the Georgian economy more than it would hurt Russia, fueling the rising anti-government sentiment in the protests.[52] Garibashvili also noted that neither the West nor Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russia during or after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and even continued "business as usual" with Russian reset, while Georgia was being asked to sacrifice itself and "destroy its economy".[53]
Following this, in June 2022, the European Union refused to approve Georgia's application to join the union, citing an alleged media censorship and the government's refusal to join the international sanctions against Russia.[54] This led to mobilization by the opposition against the government.[55] In turn, a sovereignist faction People's Power broke away from Georgian Dream in August 2022, and proposed legislation to regulate foreign influence by creating a special registry to monitor politically active foreign-funded organizations, many of which are Western-funded.[56][57] While the government claimed that the bill was necessary for public disclosure and transparency, the opposition, aided by the statements of Western embassies and politicians, managed to mobilize protests to tackle the bill, likening it to Russian foreign agent law and saying that it would have jeopardized Euro-Atlantic integration, ultimately leading to the parliament withdrawing the bill.[58]
On 8 March 2023 tens of thousands of people gathered in front of the Parliament, demanding a halt to further discussions on the law. Opposition leader Giorgi Vashadze issued an ultimatum, calling for the rejection of the bills and the release of those detained during the protests.
Amid protests in Tbilisi, Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement, cautioning against the violent change of power in Georgia,[59] with some Russian politicians suggesting Russia might use military means in case of "instability on the Russian border". In September 2023, the State Security Service of Georgia claimed to have uncovered plans of the opposition and the Western-funded groups to stage a coup in Georgia with the support of Ukraine-based Georgian oppositionist politicians.[60][61] This in turn led to the pro-Russian Georgian opposition Conservative Movement party and the TV channel Alt-Info starting to mobilize an "Anti-Maidan movement" to counter the alleged coup.[62]
However, in December 2023, the European Union decided to grant Georgia candidate status following the release from prison of oppositionist journalist Nika Gvaramia, who had been arrested on charges of abuse of power and embezzlement, and the parliament's decision to turn down impeachment proceedings against the pro-opposition president Salome Zourabichvili.[63][64][65] In late December 2023, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili summarized the year by saying that the government had managed to "preserve the peace" amid the threat of destabilization caused by "radical groups and hostile forces operating within the country",[66] and also to secure EU candidate status for Georgia.[67]
In early 2024, Georgia again experienced significant political crisis and public unrest due to the reintroduction of the "foreign agent" law, which many citizens perceived as a threat to civil liberties and democratic principles. The leader of parliamentary majority Mamuka Mdinaradze said that the reason for reintroduction of the bill was the continued circulation of slush funds in the country through non-governmental organizations and covert foreign financing of political activities.[68] On 8 April, the Bureau of Parliament of Georgia registered the bill for the parliamentary discussions.[69] Critics said that the law, requiring organizations and individuals receiving foreign funding to register as "organizations carrying the interests of a foreign power," was a measure to stifle dissent and limit the activities of NGOs and independent media. Protests erupted across the country, with demonstrators calling for the repeal of the law and the "protection of democratic freedoms". The government's response to the protests varied, with some efforts to engage in dialogue, while many instances of police violence were reported.[30][70][31]
On 11 May a record-breaking protest rally took place, widely regarded as the largest in Georgian history. Despite the rain, tens of thousands gathered at four key locations in Tbilisi: First Republic Square, Marjanishvili Metro, 300 Aragveli Metro, and Tsereteli Avenue. Demonstrators marched along both banks of the Kura, with the four streams of protesters converging symbolically at Europe Square in Metekhi to celebrate Europe Day. Estimates suggest that at least 169,000 people participated, with some reports indicating peak numbers of up to 200,000 or even 300,000.[71][72][73]
The widespread opposition to the law underscored deep-seated concerns about the future of democracy and human rights in Georgia. Protesters and other critics, including the European Union and other Western countries, spoke out against the bill, arguing that it would stifle democracy and freedom of the press in Georgia and comparing it to the Russian foreign agent law.[74] The European Union and the United States officials have been vocal in their opposition to the bill, considering that "Georgia does not needs this law" and that its passage despite repeated calls from the EU "to retract such legislation" was unacceptable.[75][76][77][78] Proponents of the bill denied this characterization, claiming it would ensure transparency of foreign funding and protect Georgia's sovereignty from malign foreign influence. People's Power has argued that the law would protect democracy and sovereignty of Georgia from foreign interference through financing of NGOs with a goal of promotion of foreign agenda.[79][80] Some have also criticized the European Union and the United States for interfering into Georgia's internal affairs and undermining its sovereign power to pass its own laws, and blackmailing Georgia with the European Union candidate status and USA sanctions in order to maintain their right to interfere into Georgia's sovereign ability through "unlimited" and "undisclosed" foreign funding of NGOs.[81][82] They have also emphasized that the local NGOs should be grassroots rather than reliant on foreign funding.[82]
In August 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said that he expected the elections to be held against the backdrop of "unprecedented" and "disruptive" foreign interference.[83] His expectation was also shared by the Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, who cited the Danish Government-sponsored "Festival of Democracy" event, organised by the non-profit organisation "Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy" in Telavi, presenting banners demanding release of Mikheil Saakashvili from prison. He said that the foreign funding was funneled into Georgian politics for the purpose of election campaigning in favor of the radical opposition parties against the ruling party.[84]
On October 5, President Salome Zourabichvili announced in an interview that she has a candidate in mind for the position of Prime Minister if the creation of a coalition government becomes relevant. She noted that the Georgian Charter requires the Prime Minister to be selected in consultation with the President. While she did not disclose the candidate’s identity, Zourabichvili emphasized that the person has no political background, which she believes is important for building public trust and reducing political polarization. She also mentioned that she will soon begin negotiations with opposition parties that signed the charter.[85][86] A day later, Shalva Papuashvili, during a briefing, revealed that the impeachment procedure against the president would be re-initiated. He cited her foreign visits without government permission, including trips to France, Germany, and Poland last week, as one of the reasons for the move.[87]
Sanctions against Georgian Dream
[edit]European Union
[edit]On October 6, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) adopted a resolution on Georgia at its Congress in Estoril, Portugal, condemning democratic regression and persecution of opposition under the Georgian Dream government. The resolution calls for sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and his family, opposes the Foreign Agents and anti-LGBT laws, and emphasizes the need for free and fair elections and democratic reforms in line with the EU’s criteria. It also criticizes political persecution, violence against opposition, and disinformation campaigns, urging the EU to support civil society, strengthen election monitoring, and impose sanctions on those undermining democracy. ALDE also supports the initiation of EU accession negotiations following democratic reforms.[88]
On October 9, the European Parliament adopted the resolution “On the Decline of Democracy and Threats to Political Pluralism in Georgia” with 495 votes in favor and 73 against. The resolution urges the European Union to freeze aid to the Georgian government, impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and other individuals responsible for the erosion of democracy, and ensure that anti-democratic laws are aligned with the criteria for visa liberalization.
Additionally, the draft resolution calls on the Georgian government to halt its campaign of opposition intimidation and anti-Western disinformation, impose sanctions on Russia, release former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds, and ensure a peaceful transfer of power based on electoral outcomes.[89][90]
United States
[edit]On 16 September 2024, the US Department of State announced visa restrictions for 60 "Georgian government officials and others who have undermined Georgia's democracy and the human rights of the Georgian people". These included senior government officials, municipal figures, business leaders, law enforcers, lawmakers and etc.[91] Additionally, the United States Department of the Treasury imposed financial sanctions on 4 Georgian citizens under Magnitsky Act for "undermining fundamental freedoms". Namely, the Chief of Special Task Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia Khareba Kharazishvili and his deputy Mileri Lagazauri were sanctioned, along with the leaders of the Conservative Movement/Alt-Info party Zura Makharadze and Konstantine Morgoshia.[92]
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze called the sanctions on Georgian officials an "insult to Georgian state".[93] On 3 October, the US embassy to Georgia confirmed that Bidzina Ivanishvili was not sanctioned by the US government.[94]
On 20 September, Voice of America (VoA) reported that the U.S. State Department and Treasury are preparing sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili. According to a high-level anonymous source, this marks a significant shift, as the sanctions package is now ready for implementation. However, it is still unclear when these sanctions will be enacted, potentially before or after the elections.
One official stated that Ivanishvili had taken steps to deepen ties with Russian oligarchs and worked to increase Russia’s influence in Georgia’s market, actions allegedly done under the guidance of Russian intelligence. The sanctions would target these activities under Executive Order 14024, which allows for sanctions related to "harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation."
An additional anonymous source familiar with the discussions told VoA that the administration’s efforts serve as a signal to the Georgian government, stressing that the U.S. is serious about its concerns. "The Biden people are trying to convey the seriousness and hope that somebody in the Georgian government is listening in a serious way," the source explained. While it remains unknown when the sanctions will be implemented, the necessary preparations are in place, with the administration continuing to hope for a shift back toward a more democratic course in Georgia.[95]
Georgian Charter
[edit]On 26 May 2024, In response to the 2023–2024 Georgian protests, President Salome Zourabichvili introduced the Georgian Charter, an action plan aimed at "fostering unity among opposition parties ahead of the parliamentary elections". The Charter, announced during Georgia's Independence Day celebrations, seeks to create a platform for the opposition to present a unified stance. Zourabichvili's proposal emphasizes a new electoral format where voters will choose between the ruling party and a coalition of opposition parties. The plan includes forming a temporary government post-elections to implement key reforms intended to "enhance democratic processes and align Georgia more closely with European standards", after which new elections will be held. The Charter's main goals include repealing laws that the opposition considers as hindrances to European integration and undertaking significant judicial and electoral reforms to ensure "a fair and democratic process".[96][97][98]
The president emphasized that the October parliamentary elections should focused on the question of "what direction the country should take rather than which individuals or parties should be elected". She stated that the 2024 elections will effectively act as a referendum on whether Georgia seeks closer integration with Europe.[99]
So far 17 political parties from the opposition, including: UNM, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Ahali, Lelo, European Georgia, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, Citizens, For Georgia,[100] For the People, the Republican Party, the Greens Party of Georgia, For Justice, European Democrats, Law and Justice, Tavisupleba, State for the People and the National Democratic Party, as well as 5 individual MPs have signed the Georgian Charter presented by the president.[101][102][103]
Some opposition parties refused to sign the agreement. Girchi has praised the president Salome Zourabichvili's initiative 'Georgian Charter' for attempting to bring opposition together, nevertheless, they criticized her for not taking their opinions into consideration and refused to sign it.[104][105] Initially the For Georgia party also did not join the agreement, saying that they supported the reforms outlined in the charter, however, they said that talking about forming a temporary government post-elections was damaging to the pre-election process.[106] However, For Georgia later reversed its decision and signed the Charter.[107]
The ruling party MP Nino Tsilosani alleged that the opposition parties did not sign the agreement independently but were "influenced by Western embassies".[108]
MEGOBARI Act
[edit]On July 11, 2024, the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed the MEGOBARI Act (Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia's Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence Act)[109] with a vote of 41 to 6. Initiated by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson, the Act—named after the Georgian word for "friend" (Georgian: მეგობარი, romanized: megobari)—addresses "democratic and human rights issues in Georgia" and outlines specific measures for support and oversight. The MEGOBARI Act emphasizes "the U.S. commitment to upholding democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law" in Georgia. It acknowledges the progress made by Georgian civil society and stresses the need to "strengthen democracy for regional stability and U.S. interests".[110]
The Act responds to recent "democratic backsliding" by calling for increased scrutiny of the Georgian government's actions, particularly "its ties to Russia and other authoritarian regimes".[111] To ensure accountability, the Act mandates several reports on issues such as "corrupt practices that support Russian interests and evade sanctions, Russian intelligence activities, and potential Chinese cooperation". It also includes sanctions and travel bans on "individuals undermining Georgian democracy". A Democracy Monitoring Task Force will be established to "oversee democratic practices", especially during elections, to "ensure fairness".[112] Should "significant democratic progress be confirmed", the MEGOBARI Act provides for additional U.S. assistance, including a more preferential trade agreement with Georgia, enhanced people-to-people exchanges and visa simplification, an economic modernization package, and security and defense support against Russian aggression.[113]
The Act received strong bipartisan support, with committee members highlighting its importance for "supporting Georgia's democratic aspirations and countering Russian influence".[114][115][116] Secretary of State Antony Blinken also announced visa restrictions for those "undermining Georgian democracy", further demonstrating U.S. commitment.[117][118]
Georgian opposition representatives have expressed their gratitude to Congressman Wilson for his support, praising the Acts focus on Georgia's sovereignty, democracy, and Euro-Atlantic integration. They urged Congress and the Senate to pass the legislation quickly and requested additional resources and congressional visits to monitor the October parliamentary elections, given the critical nature of this support.[119][120] Conversely, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze criticized the MEGOBARI Act, labeling it as blackmail. He argued that the Act could harm Georgia-U.S. relations and criticized the approach of using sanctions and threats. Instead, he called for more constructive and pragmatic discussions to improve bilateral relations.[121][122] The ruling Georgian Dream party issued a statement, saying that the MEGOBARI Act constituted a "blackmail, intimidation" against the independent Georgian policy and "especially cynical" in the light on Georgian celebration of Independence Day two days before. The party condemned the threat of sanctions against legislators for "voting in favor of a law" and added that this was against the spirit of cooperation between sovereign nations. The party rejected the possibility of following the MEGOBARI Act, saying that "we do not intend to trade on our country's sovereignty and security, and no blackmail whatsoever can force us to go against our country".[123]
Parties and coalitions
[edit]There was a split within the largest opposition United National Movement party monthes prior to the elections.[5] In January 2023, Levan Khabeishvili unseated Nika Melia from the position of United National Movement chairman after winning internal party elections. Accusing Khabeishvili of being a protégé of shadowy businessman Davit Kezerashvili, Melia announced a break with the UNM and plans for his own party in December 2023.[124] On 11 March 2024, Melia announced the formation of Ahali party. He was joined by Nika Gvaramia, another former UNM member and founder of pro-opposition Mtavari Arkhi TV.[125] On 8 June, Tinatin Bokuchava became chair of the United National Movement, succeeding Khabeishvili, who resigned due to health complications.[126]
On 20 July 2023, the United National Movement announced an alliance with Strategy Aghmashenebeli of Giorgi Vashadze.[127] According to Khabeishvili, the coalition, named "Victory Platform", will center around former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Imprisoned on charges of abuse of power and violence, Saakashvili will lead his party in the election from prison.[128]
On 30 December 2023, Bidzina Ivanishvili, a founder of Georgian Dream, announced his return to politics as honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, suggesting he would play an active role in the election campaign.[11]
On 8 February 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze was confirmed by the parliament as the new Prime Minister of Georgia from the ruling Georgian Dream party.[129]
In March 2024, the People's Power movement was registered as a political party, and is expected to participate in the election.[130]
On 11 April, the Public Registry revoked the registration of the Conservative Movement party, banning it from participating in the election. In June 2024, it was announced that the party would merge with the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia and run together in the election.[131][132]
On 8 July, the Chair of the United National Movement, Tina Bokuchava, announced a new political platform named "Unity – to Save Georgia". This platform aims to bring together the United National Movement, Strategy Agmashenebeli — two parties that have been in "Victory Platform" coalition for a year already — as well as representatives from other parties, civil society, and academia. The new platform will use the UNM ballot number 5 in the upcoming elections.[133]
On 9 July, three opposition parties, Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, and Droa, announced their decision to post a joint election list for the Parliamentary elections in October. The leaders mentioned that an expected alliance with another party, Lelo, did not materialize due to "minor differences".[134] Subsequently, this alliance was renamed to "Coalition for Change".[135] On August 18, the Republican Party and the youth organization of Georgian Azerbaijanis "Activists for the Future" joined the coalition.[136][137][138]
On June 24, 2024, the leader of Alliance of Patriots of Georgia Irma Inashvili announced that ten conservative parties and civic organizations signed the "Declaration of Unity of the Patriots of Georgia," starting a coalition aimed at unifying traditionalist forces to promote a conservative agenda in the next parliament. The declaration invited all individuals who shared this worldview to join, fostering inclusivity while critiquing the dominant narratives of the GD and the UNM, which have "marginalized conservative voices." Its primary goal is to ensure robust representation of conservative values and interests in the Georgian Parliament.[139][140][141] On 10 July, it was reported that several parties would run under the banner of Alliance of Patriots alongside Conservative Movement/Alt Info to foster a joint electoral efforts: Georgian Idea, Georgian Mission, Conservative-Monarchist Party, Christian-Democratic Movement, and National Unit.[142]
On July 16, Mamuka Mdinaradze, Executive Secretary of Georgian Dream, announced during his speech at the opening of the election campaign and the new central office of Georgian Dream that People's Power will participate in the parliamentary elections with a common list alongside the ruling Georgian Dream party.[143][144]
On July 17, Lelo for Georgia, For the People, and the political movement Freedom Square announced their unification under a single electoral list for the upcoming elections.[145] Subsequently, this alliance was renamed to "Strong Georgia". Later in August, the Citizens party also joined the alliance.[146]
On August 1, a majority of the European Georgia electoral list, chosen during the party’s internal primary election, left the party, including key figures Giga Bokeria and Tamar Chergoleishvili. The split arose from disagreements with other key figures, Gigi Tsereteli and Akaki Bobokhidze over the primary results.[147][148]
Later, on August 15, the members who left European Georgia formally established a new party called the Federalists.[149][150] 2 days later European Georgia, in an announcement with the Unity coalition, announced that it would be running on a joint list with the UNM and Strategy Aghmashenebeli.[151] On September 25 the Federalists confirmed that they will not participate in the elections, as they were late in registering the party. Despite this, the party called on its supporters to remain engaged and vote against the Georgian Dream.[152]
The Central Election Commission of Georgia refused to register European Socialists, Union of Georgian Traditionalists and Generations for Georgia parties, citing their failure to comply with the legislative requirment to present signatures of 25 thousands voters for the registration. Along with them, 8 other parties were refused registration. Therefore, they will not take part in the elections.[153] Ilia Injia, the son of European Socialists leader Fridon Injia became a Georgian Dream candidate.[154]
At a special briefing on September 16, Salome Zourabichvili emphasized the need for a "positive, third center" to provide opposition-leaning and undecided voters with a clearer choice and announced the forthcoming coalition of two major opposition forces: Strong Georgia and ex-Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s For Georgia.[155]
She expressed her support for their readiness to unite and invited them to the Orbeliani Palace on September 17 to complete the final steps of the negotiations. Zourabichvili concluded by asserting, “I am confident that this is what society expects from you.”[156][157] The Georgian Dream MP Giorgi Kakhiani accused the President of allegedly showing her political symphaties towards these parties with her invitation, which he claimed was a violation of the Georgian constitution requiring the President to be neutral.[158]
The following day, after a meeting at the presidential administration, Khazaradze acknowledged that while some issues persist, including questions regarding the events of June 20, 2019,[159] and the Anaklia Sea Port project, he and Gakharia are united in their goal to oust the ruling Georgian Dream party. Khazaradze emphasized the critical need for the country to decide between a path aligned with Russia or a future integrated with Europe.[160]
Gakharia mentioned that Khazaradze had requested additional time to clarify his stance, indicating that negotiations were still ongoing. Gakharia reaffirmed his party's commitment to prioritizing Georgia's democratic path. He expressed gratitude to president Salome Zourabichvili for facilitating the dialogue and highlighted the upcoming elections as crucial in preventing any single party from dominating Georgian politics.[161][162][163]
On September 19, For Georgia announced via Facebook that the negotiations collapsed,[164] citing internal disagreements within Strong Georgia. However, Mamuka Khazaradze, refuted this claim, saying Strong Georgia was ready to sign the deal but was waiting for the president's invitation to finalize it. The alliance was intended to challenge the dominance of the ruling Georgian Dream party and the opposition UNM, potentially attracting hesitant voters. Despite this, disagreements, particularly over the former prime minister’s controversial past and issues of equal representation on the joint party list, led to the breakdown.[165]
On 25 September, Strong Georgia announced that former President Giorgi Margvelashvili had joined their coalition.[166]
In overall, 27 parties were registered for the October elections.[167]
List of major coalitions or political parties
[edit]List of major parties and coalitions which take part in the election.
# | Party/Coalition | Constituent parties | Leaders | Last election | Ideology | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
41 | GD | Georgian Dream | Georgian Dream People's Power |
Bidzina Ivanishvili Irakli Garibashvili Sozar Subari |
GD: 46.75% (2021) PP: N/A |
Populism, Social conservatism, Soft Euroscepticism | |
5 | U–NM | Unity – National Movement | United National Movement Strategy Aghmashenebeli European Georgia |
Mikheil Saakashvili Tinatin Bokuchava Giorgi Vashadze Gigi Tsereteli |
UNM: 30.67% (2021) SA: 1.34% (2021) EG: 1.66% (2021) |
Liberal conservatism, Atlanticism, Pro-Europeanism | |
4 | CC | Coalition for Change | Ahali Girchi – More Freedom Droa Republican Party |
Nika Gvaramia Nika Melia Zurab Japaridze Elene Khoshtaria Khatuna Samnidze |
Ahali: N/A G–MF: 1.44% (2021) Droa: 0.61% (2021) Republicans: 0.74% (2017) |
Liberalism, Classical liberalism, Pro-Europeanism | |
9 | SG | Strong Georgia | Lelo for Georgia For the People Citizens Freedom Square |
Mamuka Khazaradze Ana Dolidze Aleko Elisashvili Levan Tsutskiridze |
Lelo: 2.71% (2021) FP: 0.87% (2021) Citizens: 0.83% (2021) FS: N/A |
Conservative liberalism, Social democracy, Pro-Europeanism | |
25 | FG | For Georgia | For Georgia Conservative Party of Georgia[168] |
Giorgi Gakharia | FG: 7.8% (2021) CPG: 0.16% (2020) |
Liberal conservatism, Technocracy, Pro-Europeanism |
List of minor coalitions or political parties
[edit]List of minor parties and coalitions which take part in the election as of the 2 October.[169]
# | Party/Coalition | Constituent parties | Leaders | Last election | Ideology | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Party of Georgian Unity and Development | Kamal Muradkhanovi | |||||
2 | EG | European Democrats | — | Paata Davitaia | N/A | Pro-Europeanism | |
3 | APG | Alliance of Patriots | Alliance of Patriots Conservative Movement/Alt-Info Georgian Idea Christian-Democratic Movement[142] |
Davit Tarkhan Mouravi Giorgi Kardava Levan Chachua |
APG: 1.46% (2021) CM/Alt-Info: N/A GI: 0.43% (2020) CDM: 0.12% (2018) |
National conservatism, Right-wing populism, Hard Euroscepticism, Russophilia | |
4 | GLP | Georgian Labor Party | — | Shalva Natelashvili | 1.38% (2021) | Social Democracy, Left-wing populism, Cultural Conservatism, Pro-Europeanism | |
5 | Our United Georgia | Isaki Giorgadze | Reformism | ||||
6 | Social Democratic Party of Georgia | Avtandil Veltauri | 0.01% (2021) | Social democracy | |||
7 | Change Georgia | — | Giorgi Gagnidze | 0.07% (2020) | Economic populism, Liberalism | ||
8 | Georgia | Giorgi Liluashvili | 0.05% (2021) | ||||
9 | FG | Free Georgia | — | Kakha Kukava | 0.33% (2020) | Conservatism | |
10 | Tribuna | — | Davit Tchitchinadze | 0.14% | Left-wing populism | ||
11 | C | Chven | — | Vacant[170] | N/A | Pro-Europeanism | |
12 | Left Alliance | — | Konstantine Gugushvili | 0.01% (2021) | Social democracy, Left-wing nationalism, Cultural Conservatism | ||
13 | Georgian Unity | — | Gaioz Mamaladze | Nationalism | |||
14 | NPC-G | New Political Centre - Girchi | — | Iago Khvichia | 0.95% (2021) | Right-wing libertarianism |
Campaign
[edit]This section needs expansion with: More details about opposition parties. You can help by adding to it. (August 2024) |
Georgian Dream
[edit]On 21 August 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party officially announced starting a pre-election campaign.[171] The first campaign event was launched in the Georgian town of Mtskheta on 22 August.[172] A second campaign event was held in Ambrolauri in Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti region.[173] The Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who leads the electoral office of the ruling party, announced the delegates who would run the party's election campaign. Kobakhidze added that all delegates would be present in the ruling party's electoral list and represent their cities and regions in the Georgian Parliament.[174] Soon after, the Chair of the Government of Autonomous Republic of Adjara, Tornike Rizhvadze presented the ruling party's delegates to run the campaign for the elections of the Supreme Council of Adjara, which is held along with the elections for Georgian Parliament.[175]
On 20 August, the Political Council of Georgian Dream issued a statement, saying that the election would be a referendum on "on war vs. peace, traditional values vs. moral degradation, subservience to external powers vs. an independent and sovereign state". The party urged its supporters to "put everything aside and come out to vote", emphasizing the need for the ruling party to secure a constitutional majority in the election to implement its long-term goals. The party presented the objectives for which it would use the constitutional majority. The Georgian Dream pledged to have the former ruling United National Movement party banned upon winning office, accusing it of various crimes against the Georgian people during its rule, including pushing Georgia into the war with Russia in 2008 and seeking to embroil Georgia into a "second front" of the Russo-Ukrainian War. According to the statement, the existence of the UNM, "which is entirely controlled from outside and is constantly engaged in hostility towards the state", makes the healthy democratic process and alteration of political forces "impossible".[176]
The ruling party also promised to fully pass the Protection of Family Values and Minors bill, which it had already initiated in the Georgian Parliament. The bill, intended to ban the "LGBT propaganda", has been justified by the ruling party by a necessity of preventing the spread of "pseudo-liberal ideology" into Georgia from outside.[176]
The third objective outlined by the ruling party revolved around reintegrating Georgia's Russian-backed separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the statement, given the "dynamic development of events", Georgia might get a chance to "peacefully restore" its territorial integrity at "any time", therefore, "it will be necessary to amend the Constitution of Georgia to bring Georgia's governance system and territorial state structure in line with the new reality". According to the ruling party, the "externally-controlled anti-state" opposition parties would not be willing to support the restoration of territorial integrity, therefore, it would be necessary for the ruling party to hold constitutional majority.[176][177]
There has also been a fourth issue related to "protecting Georgia's identity and national values", however, the statement said that the issue was still under discussion within the ruling party.[176] Later Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream, elaborated that the issue was related to "faith", with several observers speculating on a plan to make the Orthodox Christianity a state religion in Georgia.[176][178]
After a several-month hiatus, Bidzina Ivanishvili delivered a speech in Mtskheta. Addressing the crowd from a specially arranged rostrum surrounded by bulletproof glass, Ivanishvili followed speeches by other Dream leaders. Bidzina Ivanishvili's speech largely reiterated the contents of the statement published by the Georgian Dream party a day earlier.[179]
His address began with a sharp critique of the United National Movement. He presented the upcoming October 26 elections as a pivotal moment to hold the UNM accountable, likening it to a "Nuremberg trials". According to Ivanishvili, securing a constitutional majority would be crucial for the Georgian Dream to effectively address and eliminate what he described as a "severe disease" that has plagued the country for two decades. He asserted that this majority would enable legal action to ban the UNM and its affiliated parties, citing legal grounds for such a move.[180]
Ivanishvili emphasized that the UNM continued unrest and wartime influence in Georgia, rendering its conviction increasingly relevant. He vowed that the Georgian Dream would not permit the country to remain on a politically unstable path and that a constitutional majority would preclude any external influence from protecting the UNM from political consequences.[180]
He further asserted that the October 26 elections should serve as a decisive moment for the Georgian people to render judgment on the UNM and its associations, including "foreign agents engaging in anti-state activities". According to Ivanishvili, only after replacing UNM with the "patriotic political forces" would Georgia be able to conduct "truly healthy elections".[180]
In his speech, Ivanishvili also referenced the proposed "LGBT propaganda bill" initiated by the Georgian Dream. He suggested that with a constitutional majority, the party would be positioned to pass this legislation.[180]
Additionally, Ivanishvili discussed the potential for bringing the issue of Georgia's territorial integrity back onto the agenda, which would necessitate constitutional amendments. He indicated that such changes would include revisions to the system of government and territorial arrangements, asserting that the UNM would obstruct these efforts and impede the restoration of territorial integrity.[180]
Finally, Ivanishvili announced the prospect of another constitutional amendment aimed at protecting Georgia's identity and national values. He provided few details, citing ongoing consultations.[181][182]
It was later confirmed that the amendment focuses on designating Orthodox Christianity as the state religion. The ruling party branded this initiative as part of their commitment to uphold "national values and traditions," in line with their campaign promises to ban "LGBT propaganda" and reinforce the role of the Church.[183]
In contrast, the Georgian Orthodox Church has expressed skepticism, fearing that such a change could compromise its independence and increase government control. High-ranking clergy members, including Metropolitan Shio Mujiri and Metropolitan Nikoloz Pachuashvili, have raised concerns about the potential implications of this proposal, arguing that it could alter the traditionally independent yet cooperative relationship between the state and the Church established by the 2002 Concordat.[184]
After the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) turned down the ruling party's proposal on declaring the GOC as the state religion in Georgia, on 31 August, during the campaign rally speech in Ozurgeti, Bidzina Ivanishvili once again addressed the issue. He confirmed the ongoing discussions between the Georgian Orthodox Church and the ruling party on the constitutional status of the Georgian Orthodox Church. He said that the proposed amendment by the ruling party would clarify the Orthodox Christianity as the "pillar of the Georgian statehood" and emphasize its role in the country's history and present.[185]
The leader of the opposition Lelo for Georgia party Mamuka Khazaradze responded to the proposal by saying that his party would support the amendment. He also accused the Georgian Dream party of manipulating with the issue, asking it to hold vote on the proposed amendment prior to the October elections. Khazaradze stated that "Georgia does not and will not exist without the Georgian Orthodox Church".[186]
Later, Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Kobakhidze clarified that Georgian Dream intends to ban a number of political parties described as the "Collective UNM" by Kobakhidze, which includes: the Unity – National Movement (UNM, European Georgia, Strategy Aghmashenebeli), Coalition for Change (Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, Republican Party), Strong Georgia (Lelo, For the People, Freedom Square, Citizens) alliances, and the For Georgia party founded by former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia. He accused these groups of secretly aligning with the United National Movement and called for criminal investigations against figures like Mamuka Khazaradze of Lelo. Kobakhidze stated that if the Constitutional Court deems the "collective National Movement" unlawful, their parliamentary mandates should be revoked after the elections.[187][188] According to Kobakhidze, the prohibition of political parties is considered a democratic process when there is a legal basis for it. He argued that in a democratic state, such actions are justifiable. Kobakhidze noted that political parties have been banned in Ukraine and Moldova, and similar measures have received positive evaluations from the EU.[189]
The EU has expressed concern over Georgian Prime Minister and officials' statements about plans to ban opposition parties, emphasizing that "political pluralism is crucial for democracy", additionally noting that "the EU is monitoring the situation closely and has all options on the table to respond".[19] Speaker of Parliament and member of ruling party Shalva Papuashvili criticized the remarks of European officials, saying that the step can not be considered as undemocratic, citing Gldani prison scandal which has revealed systemic and widespread torture in Georgian prisons during the UNM's rule that lasted from 2003–2012. He said that the UNM practiced "the system of violence and torture" while in power. Papuashvili criticized the European Union for letting the UNM leader Saakashvili to move to Europe after the end of his presidency and letting him escape justice in Georgia, as well as for shielding Saakashvili and his UNM party from responsibility for many years. He additionally stated that the reports on the intention to ban all opposition parties are "merely disinformation".[190]
Mamuka Mdinaradze, executive secretary of the Georgian Dream, emphasized the necessity of maintaining peace, working to restore territorial integrity, and preserving traditional values and independence. He emphasized that only Georgian Dream was capable of preserving peace with Russia, and at the same time pushing for the country's European integration. At the same time, Mamuka Mdinaradze emphasized the importance of traditional values and Christianity for the Georgian identity. Ultimately, He framed the party's campaign promises as "surviving physically and surviving spiritually".[191][192]
On 8 September, Bidzina Ivanishvili addressed the public during the campaign event in Akhaltsikhe behind the bulletproof glass booth. He highlited that the victory of the Georgian Dream in the 2012 Georgian parliamentary election "brought freedom" to Georgia from the "Collective UNM" and called the public to preserve these achievements. He said that GD's rule was marked by "12 years of continuous peace", warning that the "Collective UNM" was "eyeing war", once again accusing them of "provoking the August 2008 war" and "trying to drag Georgia into Russia's war against Ukraine" by opening a "second front" under the direction of "foreign patrons". He promised to put an end to the "violent attempts to impose pseudo-liberal values on our people from foreign countries", instead vowing to secure a "dignified place" for Georgia in the European Union.[193] He remarked:
On October 26, the Georgian population, unfortunately, will not decide between good and better; because of the radical opposition, the people without a motherland, on October 26 we will decide between war and peace, [between] pseudo-liberal values and nationality, family, faith and values based on independence, we will decide between the dignified European future of our country and the unacceptable reality that the radical opposition, with its foreign actors, wants to present as European.
— Bidzina Ivanishvili during the Georgian Dream campaign rally in Akhaltsikhe.[193]
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze also reiterated the message, accusing the UNM of "authoritarianism, murder, and torture of people", saying that these have nothing to do with actual European values. He accused the UNM of being backed by external "Party of War", and highlighted that the Georgian Dream government "is the first administration since the restoration of independence under which the country has not been involved in war". He said that with the UNM in power the country would be "in a much more difficult situation, like Ukraine is today".[194] He furthermore stated that 26 October election pitted against each other "statelessness and love of country, militant atheism and respect for the Church, slavery and sovereignty, moral degeneration and traditional values, war and peace", calling it a "decisive referendum".[195]
On 14 September 2024, Ivanishvili made a public speech behind the bulletproof glass during the campaign event in Gori. During his speech, he highlighted what he called a "terminal threat" of the country being dragged into the Russo-Ukrainian war, saying that the opposition seeks to open a second front against Russia. He also elaborated on Georgian Dream's electoral promises. He called the opposition the "union of criminals" who make the "healthy democratic process" in Georgia "impossible". He once again accused the former ruling United National Movement of the 2008 war with Russia and seeking to embroil the country in the Russo-Ukrainian war. He called the 2008 war the "treason" committed by the then ruling United National Movement party and blamed it for the Russian occupation of the Georgian territories. Ivanishvili reiterated that the ruling party would seek to ban the United National Movement and its "satellite parties" on grounds of their responsibility for the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.[196]
Ivanishvili also reiterated that the ruling party try to pass the "LGBT propaganda bill". He alleged that the "morality of Georgian man" was under attack from the opposition and its "foreign patrons". Ivanishvili claimed that they sought to make the Georgian people subservient by making it forget "its own past, history and values". He made a pledge to enshrine the family values in the Georgian constitution.[196]
Ivanishvili once again addressed the question of the constitutional status of the Georgian Orthodox Church. He said that Georgia and Orthodox Christianity are inseparable from each other, and described Christianity as a pillar of the Georgian and its European identity. He said that the Georgian Orthodox Church was under attack by the "internal and external enemies", and pledged to pass the constitutional law to declare the Orthodox Christianity as the pillar of the Georgian State's identity.[196]
Ivanishvili elaborated on his promises regarding the territorial integrity. Citing developments in the world politics, Ivanishvili claimed that the peaceful reintegration of the Georgia's Russian-backed separatist republics could become relevant soon, which would necessitate changes to the Georgia's constitution.[196]
Ivanishvili also stated what he claimed to be his "main message" which he had not voiced previously. He said that "a political assessment" was finally given to the 2008 war, blaming the UNM for provoking it and calling it the "worst crime committed by them". Ivanishvili accused the UNM of committing "many atrocities" which he claimed were proved by evidences. Ivanishvili claimed that the 2008 war was "a well-planned provocation from the outside against the Georgian and Ossetian people, the purpose of which was to split unity, destroy relations and make them exist in conditions of endless, artificial confrontation". He stated that the 2008 war was "ordered from outside" and executed by the "stateless agents". He pledged to hold the "Nuremberg trials" for the UNM and also said that Georgia needs to apologize to the Ossetian people for "the flames of fire in which our Ossetian brothers and sisters were enveloped by the traitorous National Movement in 2008". He said that only Georgian Dream could ensure reconciliation with the Ossetian people.[196][197][198]
Ivanishvili's statements received sharp criticism from the opposition parties. The Unity – National Movement released a statement, saying that it is "Ivanishvili who should apologize for the treasonous statements". It said that his statements were in Russia's interests and undermining Georgia's non-recognition policy towards the occupied territories.[199] The U—NM called Ivanishvili's statement "a national shame". It said that the goal of Ivanishvili's statement was to "shift blame for the 2008 war from Russia to the former Georgian government".[199][200] The UNM chairman Tina Bokuchava remarked: "What does he [Ivanishvili] say to the families of our national heroes... that they and all of us have to apologize to the enemy? Georgia does not apologize to the enemy".[201] The leader of Strong Georgia, Mamuka Khazaradze, responded to Ivanishvili's statements by saying that "all wars in Georgia were started with the hands of Russia" and added that it was the "Georgian hero boys who sacrificed themselves for the motherland" deserving an apology for the current state of Georgia. Khazaradze called Georgian Dream the "Russian Dream".[202] Grigol Gegelia from Lelo for Georgia said that the statement about the apology was "shameful" and that the final result of Ivanishvili's policy would be Georgia officially "falling into the clutches of Russia". Nika Gvaramia, a leader of Coalition for Change, said that with his statements Ivanishvili attempted "to destroy the dignity of our country" and "falsify history against our motherland". Beka Liluashvili, a member of For Georgia party, said that Ivanishvili's statements had "very troubling accents" as they "removed Russia as an occupying state" and "blamed the Western world" for the war.[201] Alexander Rakviashvili, a leader of Girchi, stated that "our soldiers, family members of fallen soldiers and population has nothing to apologize for because it was Russia who attacked us". He said that Ivanishvili should apologize for his statement.[203] Many relatives of Georgian soldiers who died in the 2008 war, such as the wife of Giorgi Antsukhelidze, who was tortured by the South Ossetian militants, publicly denounced Ivanishvili's statements.[204][205][206][207][208]
The former president of the partially recognized, Russian-backed South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, responded critically to a recent statement made by Ivanishvili. Kokoity described Ivanishvili's statement as "bold" but questioned its sincerity. He reiterated that his position on the Russo-Georgian War had not changed, maintaining that Saakashvili and his government were "international criminals" who should be punished. However, he criticized the notion of solely blaming Saakashvili and the United States, calling it simplistic and short-sighted, and argued that all of Georgia was responsible for aligning with the West.
Kokoity further insisted that Georgia should recognize South Ossetia’s independence, sign peace agreements, and return disputed territories, including the Truso and Gudauri gorges, which he referred to as "ancestral Ossetian lands." He dismissed the economic reparations previously proposed by Georgia as insufficient, emphasizing the significant loss of life and emotional trauma suffered by the Ossetian people. In his remarks, Kokoity urged Ossetians not to become "puppets" of political and public groups funded by Ivanishvili and expressed concerns that Georgian intelligence services might become active in South Ossetia. He concluded by asserting that any peace between Georgia and South Ossetia must be "on Russia's terms," with South Ossetia and Abkhazia serving as key outposts for Russia in the South Caucasus to ensure "regional stability".[209][210]
On 28 September, Ivanishvili gave speech during the rally in Telavi and addressed Kakhetians. Ivanishvili accused the UNM of trying to alienate Georgia from its national values. In particular, Ivanishvili highlighted what he described as UNM’s attack on Georgian viniculture, which he described as a part of Georgian national identity. On the other hand, he claimed that the Georgian Dream implemented state programs to restore the viniculture and winemaking industry and traditional Russian market.[211]
Ivanishvili called the UNM a "political sarcoma" to be "cut from the Georgian body". Ivanishvili reiterated his accusation against UNM of being responsible for "the tragedy of August 2008" and claimed that the UNM itself recognized that it started the war by signing the conclusion of EU’s commission headed by Heidi Tagliavini, which he claimed blamed Georgia for the war. Ivanishvili claimed that UNM was trying to keep Georgia "in a state of constant conflict and confrontation" and promised that the punishment would be strict for UNM after the elections. Ivanishvili called the leaders of UNM "Georgian by passport but stateless in mind". Ivanishvili at the same time promised the European future for Georgia "only with peace, dignity and prosperity".[211][212]
Speaker of Georgian parliament Shalva Papuashvili also gave speech in Telavi. He emphasized that "rapprochement with the European Union should not be a wordless fulfillment of instructions, but a two-way mutual examination, mutual respect, mutual acceptance, and not absorption and loss" for Georgia. He said that Georgia deserves a place in Europe as a bearer of Christian faith, and co-creators of agriculture and viniculture, which he said were woven into the European identity.[213]
Unity — National Movement
[edit]In early January 2022, it was revealed that imprisoned former president and leader of United National Movement (UNM), Mikheil Saakashvili, was working on a 9-point economic plan with the UNM economist Roman Gotsiridze.[214][215] On 10 January, Saakashvili announced that the plan was completed and soon to be presented to the public.[216]
The Saakashvili plan was ultimately released on 3 February. The plan outlined nine theses for economic development: judicial reform, English law, arbitration, decriminalization of economic crimes; de-oligarchization; energy development; elimination of bureaucracy and irrelevant spending; a single tax principle; Infrastructure and transport development; Lazika construction, agricultural development and "Georgian silicon valley".[217][218] It focused on deregulation, digitalization of public services, reducing corruption in the court system, democratic development, Small government, the non-interventionism in the economics and protection of the private property as the means of attracting foreign investments to stimulate the economic growth.[219]
The plan envisaged the creation of the constitutional commission on the judiciary reform, decreasing time frames for case review, and limiting corruption. It called for the unrestricted application of the English law in Georgia on the commercial matters, expansion of the application of private arbitrate, and decriminalization of economic crimes.[219] The plan outlined deoligarchization as one of its main goals and proposed to ban the individuals owning more than 5% of Georgia's GDP from joining, founding or funding political parties.[219]
The plan also envisaged Georgia's economic development model as largely infrastructure-driven. In particular, the plan focused on building new hydro power plants, railways, and airports in Georgia, for the country to become a "regional logistical and transport hub". It named the bitcoins as a major problem, citing the "Abkhaz and Georgian clans" over-exploiting electricity, and the lack of accountability.[219]
The Saakashvili plan called for outsourcing large parts of public services to the private sector and gradual downsizing of public sector. It also revived the idea of building the new Lazika city within the planned time frame of 10 years, presenting it as a future "financial capital" of the country. For the Georgian agricultural sector, Saakashvili stated that bringing new technologies from abroad would be the only viable path for the development, and also supported the idea of cutting subsidies to some sectors, which he claimed would actually stimulate more entrepreneurship and growth. The plan called for "agricultural insurance system" to be devised by the government for stimulating agricultural development.[219]
Citing Belarus, Saakashvili presented "Georgian silicon valley" as a new project. He called for Rustavi or some other city close to capital to become "tax-free zone" and privatization of enterprises there for symbolic prices with the investment obligations.[219]
On 4 September 2024, the chairman of the UNM Tina Bokuchava presented "5 priorities" of her party and coalition partners during the campaign event in Kvareli: European integration, increasing average income, increasing pension, strengthening Georgian families and breaking up monopolies. In foreign policy, the coalition promised opening accession negotiations with the European Union, negotiating free trade and visa liberalization agreements with the United States and scrapping Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. In terms of internal policy, Bokuchava promised free school meals, free housing for students and cancelling pension loans.[220]
For Georgia
[edit]On 8 August 2024, the For Georgia party leader Giorgi Gakharia went to Batumi to meet with the people and canvass the vote. On 17 August 2024, Gakharia officially kicked off the party's election campaign with the opening ceremony in Zugdidi.[221]
Gakharia's promises during the election campaign included increasing the minimum wage from 50 GEL to 950 GEL, introducing six-month unemployment benefits and tying the increase of pensions with that of the economy.[222]
Strong Georgia
[edit]On 5 September 2024, the Strong Georgia coalition presented its election plan called "Ilia's way"[223] to the public in Saguramo, in the vicinity of the Ilia Chavchavadze's statue. The coalition stated that it would introduce visa regime for Russian citizens in Georgia, restrict direct flights with Russia, and ban selling agricultural land to Russians. It promised to push for Anaklia deepwater port construction and to create "200 thousand new jobs", although it did not specify what measures would be taken for this goal. It promised to introduce a heavy gambling tax and use the increased budget funds to raise pensions. Ana Dolidze, social democratic member of coalition from For the People party, presented plan to increase average income and minimum wage. She announced that these goals would be achieved in cooperation with the "business, small and medium businesses". Levan Tsutskiridze, a leader of Freedom Square party, focused on education reform. The coalition promised greater European Integration, vowing to establish special ministry to push for Georgia's accession to the EU, increase trade with the EU, and create greater opportunities for the youth to move to the European countries through student exchange programs.[224]
On 19 September, during the meeting with pensioners, Mamuka Khazaradze noted that the coalition was planning to increase the taxes on gambling from 15% to 25%, citing Illinois as an example. He also called for an end to the "exploitative practices related to pension loans and overdrafts" and promised "proper oversight" over the pension fund.[225]
Coalition for Change
[edit]During the congress in Rustavi, Nika Gvaramia, leader of the Coalition for Change, addressed the audience. Gvaramia told the representatives of small and medium businesses that they represented "the driving force propelling this country forward" and promised them to lower taxes, attract more investments and open avenues to the European, American, and Chinese markets. In addition, Gvaramia addressed Georgian farmers, saying "do not let anyone deceive you into believing that you need state assistance every year. Do not be misled into thinking that your labour is futile or that Russia is your only solution. The European Union, the United States, and China offer enormous markets, which will be available to you once we take office".[226] Gvaramia emphasized his own experience of what he called a "political imprisonment" at the hands of the Georgian Dream government, addressing the prison population by telling them that "I will be your supporter in every circumstance" and promising to deliver them what they deserve.[227]
Alliance of Patriots of Georgia
[edit]During the election campaign, the Alliance of Patriots, Conservative Movement/Alt-Info and Georgian Idea, running on the same electoral list, held joint meetings with the supporters throughout country. The meetings were held in Mtskheta, Rustavi, Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Zestaponi, Batumi, Kutaisi and etc. Moreover, members of Alt-Info opened several new offices in various regions to better communicate with the potential voters.[228][229]
During the meetings, the parties presented several initiatives to the voters. In terms of education, the parties promised to introduce teaching religion into school curriculums, increase wages for teachers, free school meals and extra-courses, and free strength training sections in all schools. In healthcare and social protection, the parties promised universal health care, establishing state-run pharmacies run on low prices to counteract privately held pharmacies and monopolies, and an abortion ban. To reinvigorate economy, the parties stated that they would issue low-percent state loans to the businesses, protect Georgian businesses from foreign imports through high tariffs, negotiate openning up Russian and other post-Soviet markets for Georgian products, and nationalize "strategic resources". The parties said that they would argue for a ban on foreign ownership of Georgian agricultural land, an increased support for local manufacturing, as well as abolishing taxes on land in mountaneous regions to counteract their depopulation. The parties named several legislative proposals they would push for in the Parliament of Georgia: expanding the use of referendums to decide on public issues, making the office of Public Defender of Georgia electable, abolishing "gender legislation", introducing an amnesty for those imprisoned on family violence charges, and establishing a "real anti-monopoly agency".[228]
In September 2024, the Alliance of Patriots published its electoral video clip called "Why are we poor?". It argued that Georgia remains a developing economy because for 30 years (since the dissolution of the Soviet Union) the country "had been run on free market economic principles", such as the idea that if state does not intervene in the economy, the market will "self-regulate" with "invisible hand". Criticizing this theory, the video clip cited China and South Korea as examples of the "most successful development models", with them being "hybrid economies" in which the state runs and intervenes in the "strategic sectors", while otherwise allowing free entrepreneurship. The video clip credited this model for creating and developing "high-tech industries" in these countries, such as automotive industry, electronics industry and etc. The video clip also argued for increased protectionism against cheap foreign imports to boost local economy and negotiating with Russia to open up its market for Georgian products, which it argued would be crucial for the economic development.[230]
Electoral system
[edit]The Parliament of Georgia is composed of 150 members who are elected for a four-year term.
As stipulated by constitutional amendments that were adopted on 26 September 2017, the 2024 election will mark the move to a fully proportional system with a 5% minimal threshold for parties to enter parliament.[231][232][4]
A similar seat distribution method used in previous elections is being applied for the proportional system.[233] For the 2024 election with 150-member proportional representation, the method involves multiplying the number of votes by 150 and then dividing it by the sum of votes received by all parties that passed 5% threshold (including by the votes of party for which the number of seats is determined with this calculation) to determine the number of seats the party will get in parliament. If after these calculations for all parties the number of total seats distributed is still below 150, the remaining seats will be proportionally distributed among the parties that crossed the 5% threshold.[234]
On 6 February 2023, the Central Election Commission of Georgia adopted a decree introducing an electronic voter registration and voting system at most of the polling stations.[235]
On 4 April 2024, Georgia's Parliament swiftly abolished mandatory gender quotas, with 85 MPs voting in favor and 22 against. Previously, the law required that at least one in every four candidates on a party list be a woman. The decision was part of a deal between the ruling Georgian Dream party and the opposition Girchi party: Georgian Dream supported Girchi’s proposal to abolish the quotas, while Girchi agreed to back the Georgian Dream candidate for Central Electoral Commission Chairperson.[236][237]
On 27 August 2024, president Salome Zourabichvili signed a decree setting 26 October as the date for the parliamentary elections.[238]
On 20 February 2024, the Georgian Parliament passed amendments to the electoral code with 81 votes in the third reading. These amendments change how the Chairman and "professional members" of the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC) are elected and abolish the Deputy Chairman role, traditionally reserved for an opposition representative.
Under the new law, the Speaker of Parliament, instead of the president, nominates and opens the competition for the election of the CEC Chairman and professional members. Parliament requires a 3/5 majority (90 votes) in the first round to elect candidates. If unsuccessful, a simple majority (76 votes) can be used in the next round, with two attempts allowed. If both attempts fail, the president gains the authority to appoint the CEC chairperson/member. The law also stipulates that CEC members serve a full five-year term, even if elected with a lower quorum.
The CEC is composed of 17 members: 7 nominated by the Speaker of Parliament and appointed by Parliament, and 9 nominated by opposition parties. The opposition and civil society organizations argue that these changes increase political pressure on the CEC and compromise its neutrality, violating the European Commission's conditions[239] and ignoring the Venice Commission's recommendations against these amendments.[240]
On May 30, the Parliament adopted further amendments to the electoral code, including changes to the CEC's operational rules and the abolition of the CEC advisory group, which included representatives from the Public Defender and selected national and international experts. The ruling Georgian Dream party justified these changes by claiming that the advisory group was not functional due to the lack of participation from monitoring organizations.
Another significant amendment is the change in the CEC's decision-making process. Previously, decisions required a two-thirds majority. Now, if a decision cannot be passed in a CEC meeting, it will be subject to a revote at the same meeting and will be considered passed if it receives a majority vote. The ruling party defends this as an anti-deadlock mechanism.[241]
On August 16, the CEC issued a decree requiring the chairman of each precinct election commission to draw lots to assign duties among commission members one week before the election, instead of on election day. Critics argue this change gives authorities time to influence the election process and threatens transparency. The opposition has challenged this decree in court, but the Tbilisi City Court upheld the CEC's decision.
Independent watchdogs and opposition parties remain concerned that these changes undermine the election process's fairness and transparency, particularly ahead of the critical elections in October.[242]
Concerns have been raised about the voting rights of Georgian emigrants. Despite the significant economic impact of Georgian emigrants through remittances, their participation in national elections remains limited. Official statistics indicate that over 125,000 people left Georgia in the past year, while estimates suggest that the number of Georgian emigrants could be as high as 1.6 million.
The current voting procedures for Georgians abroad are criticized for being cumbersome, with few polling stations often located only in major cities, making it challenging for emigrants residing in more remote areas to vote. As a result, voter turnout among emigrants has been relatively low; for instance, only 66,217 registered to vote in the 2020 parliamentary elections, with just 12,247 actually participating. Various stakeholders, including opposition parties, non-governmental organizations, and president Salome Zourabichvili, advocate for more accessible voting options, such as additional polling stations, electronic voting, or extended voting periods. However, the government, led by the ruling "Georgian Dream" party, has been slow to respond, citing bureaucratic and logistical challenges. Critics argue that the reluctance to reform the voting process may stem from a political strategy to limit the influence of emigrants, who are perceived as a potentially opposition-leaning electorate.[243][244][245] In September 2024, the CEC said that it would open 60 polling stations in 42 countries.[246]
Opinion polls
[edit]Prior to the election, the polls have been conducted by a number of pollsters in Georgia. The Edison Research polls have been commissioned by the pro-opposition Formula TV, while another pro-opposition channel Mtavari Arkhi has commissioned ISSA and Savanta to conduct the polls.[247][248] The polls by Georgian Opinion Research Business International (GORBI) have been conducted on behalf of pro-government Imedi TV company.[249][250] The IRI has published its results without allocating the number of undecided voters.
Parties in bold pass the (5%) threshold.
Date | Sample size | Pollster | GD | Unity | For Georgia | Coalition for Change | Strong Georgia | NPC-Girchi | GLP | APG | No party | Others | N/A | Lead | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
GD | PP | UNM | SA | EG | FG | CP | Girchi-MF | Droa | Ahali | RPG | Lelo | FP | FS | Citizens | APG | CM/Alt Info | GI | |||||||||
29 September–8 October 2024 | 1,561 | Savanta | 36 | 14 | 10 | 18 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 3 | – | 6 | – | 18 | ||||||||||||
18–30 September 2024 | 1,700 | GORBI | 59.5 | 13.6 | 3.8 | 10.3 | 4.5 | 2.7 | – | 2.5 | – | 3.1 | – | 45.9 | ||||||||||||
17–29 September 2024 | 1,200 | Edison Research | 33 | 19 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 4 | 4 | 3 | – | 1 | – | 14 | ||||||||||||
10–22 September 2024 | 1,200 | Edison Research | 32 | 20 | 11.9 | 11.9 | 9.9 | 4.7 | 5 | 3.6 | – | 1 | – | 12 | ||||||||||||
1–15 September 2024 | 1,200 | Edison Research | 32.3 | 20 | 10.5 | – | 10.9 | 9.3 | 6 | 5.1 | 3.6 | – | 2.3 | – | 12.3 | |||||||||||
29 August–8 September 2024 | 1,000 | Edison Research | 34 | 19.2 | 10.6 | – | 9.1 | 9.9 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 3 | – | 3.3 | – | 14.8 | |||||||||||
24 July–4 August 2024 | 1,700 | GORBI | 59.3 | 13.1 | 2.2 | 4.8 | – | 5.5 | – | 5.8 | – | 2.1 | – | 3 | – | 4.2 | – | 46.2 | ||||||||
11–24 July 2024 | 1,000 | Edison Research | 32.4 | 17.3 | 1.9 | 11.2 | – | 9.9 | – | 12.8 | 2.2 | 5.2 | 3.3 | 2.6 | – | 1.3 | – | 15.1 | ||||||||
June–July 2024 | 2,000 | ISSA | 34.4 | 0.8 | 16.9 | 4.4 | 6.9 | – | 5.1 | 12.4 | – | 8 | 2.3 | – | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 0.9 | – | – | 0.3 | – | 17.5 | ||
1–10 April 2024 | 1,601 | ISSA | 37.4 | 0.6 | 18.8 | 2.3 | 5.2 | – | 1.7 | 13.8 | 0.4 | 4.7 | 1.8 | – | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 0.6 | 2.2 | – | – | 3.9 | – | 18.6 | ||
11–18 March 2024 | 1,711 | GORBI | 60.4 | – | 12.6 | 4.5 | 3.7 | – | 3 | 1.6[f] | – | 4.7 | – | – | 0.6 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.9 | – | – | – | 6 | – | 47.8 | ||
1–22 December 2023 | 1,500 | Edison Research | 36.6 | 2.5 | 21.5 | 0.7 | 8.8 | – | 5 | – | – | 6.7 | 3.7 | – | 1.7 | 2.9 | 4.7 | 1.7 | 3 | – | – | 0.5 | – | 15.1 | ||
20 October–6 November 2023 | 1,000 | Edison Research | 37 | 3 | 21 | 1 | 9 | – | 4 | – | – | 5 | 4 | – | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | – | – | 1 | – | 16 | ||
30 September–20 October 2023 | 1,212 | GORBI | 55 | – | 20 | 3 | 3 | – | 4 | – | – | 4 | – | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | – | – | – | 5 | – | 35 | ||
14 September–14 October 2023 | 1,200 | IRI[g] | 25 | 1 | 16 | <1 | 4 | – | 2 | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | – | 17 | 1 | 23 | 9 | ||
7–24 September 2023 | 1,500 | Edison Research | 37 | 3 | 22 | 1 | 10 | – | 4 | – | – | 4 | 4 | – | 2 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 3 | – | – | <1 | – | 15 | ||
25 May–14 June 2023 | 1,500 | Edison Research | 37 | 2 | 25 | 3 | 1 | 6 | – | 4 | 2 | – | – | 4 | 3 | – | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | – | – | – | – | 12 |
22 April–7 May 2023 | 1,212 | GORBI | 53 | – | 19 | 4 | 2 | 2 | – | 3 | – | – | – | 2 | – | – | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | – | – | – | 7 | – | 34 |
4–23 March 2023 | 1,500 | IRI[g] | 19 | <1 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 3 | – | 3 | 1 | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | 2 | 2 | 2 | <1 | 1 | – | 16 | <1 | 27 | 5 |
17–30 November 2022 | 2,024 | GORBI | 52 | - | 23 | 3 | 3 | 1 | – | 3 | – | – | – | 3 | – | – | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | – | – | – | 4 | – | 29 |
13 September–2 October 2022 | 1,500 | IRI[g] | 25 | – | 12 | 1 | – | 3 | – | 3 | 2 | – | – | 1 | 2 | – | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | – | 17 | 2 | 23 | 13 |
4–24 March 2022 | 1,486 | IRI[g] | 31 | – | 16 | 2 | – | 4 | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | 1 | – | 2 | 1 | 1 | – | 15 | 2 | 19 | 15 |
2020 election | 48.22 | – | 27.18 | 3.15 | 3.79 | – | 0.16 | – | – | – | – | 3.15 | – | – | 1.33 | 2.89 | 1.00 | 3.14 | – | 0.43 | – | 5.54 | – | 21.04 |
Notes
[edit]- ^ People's Power is running its candidates on GD's party list.
- ^ In 2020, Lelo got 4 seats while Citizens got 2.
- ^ United National Movement in 2020 ran as a part of Strength is in Unity coalition getting 25 seats (with 8 being listed as non-partisan candidates). Progress and Freedom and Victorious Georgia were also a part of the Strength is in Unity coalition getting 4 and 1 seats respectively. Strategy Aghmashenebeli and Law and Justice together under the same bloc gaining 3 and 1 seat respectively, whilst European Georgia ran independently getting 5 seats.
- ^ Conservative Party of Georgia is running its candidates on FG's party list.
- ^ Republicans and State for the People in 2020 ran as a part of Strength is in Unity coalition getting 2 and 3 seats respectively.
- ^ The Ahali party was not mentioned in the answers, the results of the party are based on the answers given spontaneously by the respondents.[clarification needed]
- ^ a b c d The results are shown without allocating undecided voters.
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{{cite web}}
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